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Abstract 
As in economic theory start-up enterprises have been seen as important sources of 
growth, the government support measures to enterprises have been a common 
practice around the world for decades. As the governmental support to enterprises is 
often of a considerable amount of money there is a need to assess its efficiency. In 
the present article we study the impact of Estonian start-up grants distributed in 
2002 and 2003 on various indicators of firm performance with econometric 
methods, namely propensity score matching. We use the data from the Estonian 
Business Register in order to study the impact of start-up grants on various 
economic indicators like the number of employees, turnover, equity, fixed assets and 
firm survival. The results showed that the start-up grants proved to affect positively 
the number of employed people and turnover, yet the impact on productivity was 
negative. One implication of the study is that it is difficult to achieve different goals 
to the same extent with a single governmental grant. 
Keywords: start-up grants, impact evaluation, Estonia 
1. Introduction 
In the economic theory entrepreneurship is seen as an important source of economic 
growth and enhancing the development of entrepreneurship is one of the 
possibilities to sustain stable economic growth. Start-up enterprises which usually 
grow faster than the incumbent enterprises enrich the economic development by 
creating new jobs and by stimulating innovation. The government support measures 
to enterprises have been a common practice around the world for decades. There are 
many different ways to support enterprises – e.g. loans with below market average 
interest rate, loan guarantees or simply financial grants given to enterprises. But as 
the governmental support to enterprises is often of a considerable amount of money 
there is a need to assess its efficiency. The aim of the impact analysis of support 
measures can be to obtain information about the performance of different measures 
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or projects or to learn about the ways of enhancing the existing support programs 
(instruments). 
In the academic literature there can be found many studies estimating the impact of 
government grants to enterprises (for literature reviews, see e.g. Masso and Vildo 
2006; Klette et al. 2000; David et al. 2000). Quite many of these are about the R&D 
grants, for instance, whether the public R&D funding crowds out the private funding 
or not (see e.g. Czarnitski and Licht 2006). There have been made much less studies 
on the impact of start-up grants. The few examples that we know are as follows. Del 
Monte and Scalera (2001) estimated the life duration of the new firms in Italy; their 
results showed that the subsidies proportional to the size of projects induced a bias 
towards larger and more risky firms. Almus (2001) found in case of Germany that 
firms receiving public start-up assistance performed better in terms of employment 
growth over a six year period. Crepon and Duguet (2003) found from the analysis of 
French data with propensity score matching techniques that start-up subsidies 
increased significantly the survival of the firms created by former unemployed 
people; and the allocation of subsidies acted as a screening process improving the 
performances of the bank loans; the effect of subsidies was stronger than that of 
bank loans.  
While these studies are on the developed countries, less is known about the 
effectiveness of start-up grants in case of developing and transition economies 
(previous studies on governmental grants have analyzed the effectiveness of R&D 
grants in Central and Eastern European countries, see e.g. Czarnitski and Licht 
2006; Burger et al. 2006). As summarized by Masso et al. (2007), during the 
transition from a socialist to a market economy, the business sector is expected to be 
especially dynamic with lots of entries and exits taking place; while in such 
conditions it might have been for newcomers easier to find a niche in the 
underdeveloped industries and survive, on the other hand, start-up’s were hurt by the 
underdevelopment of market economy institutions, constraints in capital and labour 
markets, and the entrepreneurs lacking experience on how to operate a business in 
market economy. 
The goal of the present article is to estimate the impact of Estonian start-up grants 
with econometric methods. The impact of start-up grants given in 2002 and 2003 are 
under investigation. We seek to estimate the differences between supported and not 
supported enterprises in terms of different economic indicators like the number of 
employees, turnover, equity, fixed assets. Also the impact on the survival of 
supported and not supported enterprises was studied. The estimation is done in 
addition to descriptive tables with the use of statistical methods like propensity score 
matching technique. In case of matching techniques the goal is to form a 
counterfactual for the treated unit (in this case supported enterprise), that is the 
expected potential outcome of the supported enterprise in case of not being granted 
the support, by using the performance of the enterprises not granted a support. 
Therefore, we seek a ‘perfect twin’ for each observation of the treatment group, i.e. 
at least one observation of the potential control group that is as similar as possible to 
the treated observation with respect to a given distance measure. Thus, our 391
contribution to the literature is that this is one of the first studies on how the policy 
measures towards start-up firms in late or former transition countries have 
succeeded.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe the data and 
the characteristics of the start-up grants’ programme used in Estonia during 2002-
2003. Section 3 describes our methodological approach to the estimation of the 
impact of the governmental grants, while section 4 presents firstly the results from 
the descriptive tables and thereafter from the econometric estimations. The final 
section concludes. 
2. Overview of the data and the Estonian start-ups grants 
The entrepreneurial support scheme that is under consideration in this paper is 
governmental start-up grants that were given out in 2002 and 2003 by Enterprise 
Estonia. According to a study that was conducted in 2003, start-up grants were the 
most well-known governmental support measure among entrepreneurs in 2002 and 
2003 (Saar Poll 2003). 
The main aim of the start-up grants measure was to support the starting and 
development of small enterprises (Stardiabi ettevõtluse toetamiseks 2001, Stardiabi 
programmi kord 2002). As the Estonian business activity is lower than the average 
in Europe, there is a need to increase the business activity and to encourage the 
potential entrepreneurs (Eesti elanike … 2004).  
In 2002, the following costs that were directly connected to an explicit business plan 
allowed to be financed with the start-up grant: investments (machinery, equipment 
and other industrial or services industry related fixed assets); purchase and 
renovation of facilities or their reconciliation with EU requirements; developmental 
activities (patent research, license purchase etc). In 2003, in addition to these 
aforementioned restrictions working assets, real estate and facilities purchases were 
not allowed to be financed with the start-up grant. 
The applicants that were eligible for the start-ups grant had to be business 
associations and self-employed entrepreneurs registered in Estonia and they had to 
be in the phase of starting their business. In 2002, projects that were aimed at 
advancing entrepreneurship outside of Tallinn, Tartu and Pärnu were favoured. In 
2003, projects that were aimed at advancing entrepreneurship outside of Tallinn 
were favoured. Enterprises that corresponded to the following criteria were 
considered to be eligible: 
1) Enterprises that had up to 50 employees and less than 10 million kroons of 
turnover and that had actually operated for maximum of 2 years. In 2003, the 
eligible enterprise was allowed to have actually operated for maximum of 1 
year. 
2) The enterprise was not allowed to be a subsidiary of any other legal person. 
3) The enterprise was not allowed to have any accrued taxes or the accrued taxed 
had to be given the dates of payment. 392
4) The enterprises were not allowed to be under bankruptcy proceedings. 
In 2003, there were also a couple of additional requirements – governmental 
institutions were not allowed to be the owners of the supported business entities and 
more than 50% of the holding or capital stock had to belong to an Estonian citizen. 
Eligible sectors were manufacturing, industrial production, services that were 
supporting manufacturing industry and tourist services. In 2002, the maximum limit 
of the grant was 50 000 kroons (approximately 3 200 euros). In some exceptional 
cases, when the business plan was oriented to developing exporting activities or to 
the substantial growth of the enterprise, the maximum limit was 100 000 kroons 
(approximately 6 400 euros). Each enterprise was allowed to apply only once. In the 
case of enterprises from Harjumaa (the region around the capital of Estonia, Tallinn), 
the self-financing ratio had to be 45%, in enterprises active in other counties, the 
self-financing ratio had to be 35% of the worth of the project. In 2003, the maximum 
grant limit was 100 000 kroons but not more than 75% of the costs associated with 
the project. 
Several different criteria were taken into account by Enterprise Estonia while 
deciding to whom the grant was given. Among other things, projects that aimed at 
creating new jobs or retaining existent jobs, that were oriented at developing 
exports, that were aimed at making use of new technology or that were research and 
development projects and projects that had higher share of self-financing were 
favoured (Stardiabi ettevõtluse toetamiseks 2001; Stardiabi programmi kord 2002). 
Taking into account the size of the grant and the average size of the equity capital of 
supported enterprises, it seems that the grant was of a sufficient size for starting a 
business. On the other hand, the number of different objectives and their spectrum 
seems to be too large. Based on different theoretical and empirical articles one might 
say that in the case of business start-ups, the growth of the enterprise is of a 
substantial importance. Therefore, the fact that enterprises which aimed at fast 
growth were supported is anticipated.  
So far only two studies have somewhat analyzed the efficiency of Estonian start-up 
grants. The reason for this is very simple and it is the lack of data. Therefore, the 
analysis conducted so far has utilized qualitative research methods. Two different 
institutions have researched the efficiency of start-up grants – National Audit Office 
of Estonia (NAOE) and Centre for Policy Studies “PRAXIS” on the request of 
Estonian Economic and Communications Ministry (Riigikontroll 2004b; 
Riigikontroll 2004a; Kuusk, Jürgenson 2007). NAOE’s aim was to estimate the 
impact of different governmental entrepreneurial support measures to employment 
in supported regions. Among the analyzed measures were also start-up grants. 
PRAXIS’s aim was to analyze the overall efficiency of start-up grants – they tried to 
estimate to what extent the start-up grants had fulfilled their objectives. 
NAOEs main implications were connected to the overall design of business support 
measures. They claimed that the objectives specified so far were not clear enough 
and they emphasized the need to work out a unitary set of desirable outcomes which 393
would contribute to a more aligned government policy package (Riigikontroll 
2004a; Riigikontroll 2004b). 
The study by PRAXIS concluded that the start-up grant was an important support 
scheme which was known and used widely among entrepreneurs (Kuusk, Jürgenson 
2007). Entrepreneurs that had received the start-up grant claimed that without the 
grant they would not have carried out the project in the planned volume and it would 
have taken a lot more time – therefore, the dead-weight component of this measure 
was estimated to be on a medium level. The critique that was brought out in the 
study was directed to the time when the grants’ effect was over. It was claimed that 
there weren’t any instruments to support entrepreneurs who were not start-ups any 
more but were in the phase of fast growth. The lack of these kinds of instruments 
could have jeopardized the results achieved with the start-up grant. 
In the present article we use for the estimation of the start-up grants’ impact the 
Estonian Business register data on new start up firms from year 2002 till 2003. The 
data includes all registered firms without any size limit, and it covers all sectors with 
the exclusion of banks. In addition to the general data on enterprises like the year of 
registration, number of employees, ownership, legal form etc., also the items of 
balance sheets, incomes and costs are available. We excluded from the analysis all 
start-up enterprises that due to the aforementioned reasons were not eligible for the 
grant. In the period 2002-2003 there were in our data altogether more than 5 
thousand start-up enterprises; according to Statistics Estonia, the overall firm entry 
rate was in 2002 11.1% and in 2003 12.3%. The data is linked then with the data 
from the Enterprise Estonia on the supported enterprises (altogether 188 firms). One 
disadvantage of the data is that we have no information about the person who started 
the enterprise. 
3. Methodological approach 
The array of methods that are used to analyze the impact government support 
measures is very wide. The majority of the methods can be divided into two broad 
categories – qualitative and quantitative methods. Taking into account the goal of the 
impact study, different methods can be combined. The present impact analysis is 
done by using quantitative methods. An overview of the rationale behind the used 
method is as follows. 
When estimating the impact of grants, the main problem is that the knowledge about 
the value of the efficiency indicator we are interested in is not known – we don’t 
know how the enterprise would have acted without the governments’ support. Let us 
use Y to denote the variable under interest that is used to evaluate the grant’s impact 
(e.g. labour productivity, level of employment, probability of survival etc.). Let 
^` 1 , 0  it GRT  be an indicator (a dummy variable) whether the firm i  received a 
grant or not at time t . Let us also denote 
1
, s t i Y   the value of the outcome with grant 
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0
, s t i Y   without grant. The causal effect is then defined as 
0
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impact of the grant, treatment effect). The problem is that for those treated, the first 
term is observable but not the second; for those not treated, the situation is vice 
versa. Thus we can only observe   
0
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1
, ,
0
, , s t i s t i t i s t i s t i Y Y GRT Y Y          . Without 
strong assumptions, the treatment effect cannot be estimated at the firm level, 
however the average treatment effect can be estimated without bias if the selection is 
due to observables. Average treatment effect of the treated (ATE1) can be written as 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983): 
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The term 
1 N  denotes the number of treated (grant receiving) firms. Since the last 
term ( ^ ` 1 | ,
0
,    t i s t i GRT Y E ) is unobservable, the causal inference is dependent on the 
construction of the counterfactual that is the outcome of the grant recipients in case 
they would not have received the grant. That is estimated by the value of the 
outcome of the firms that did not receive grants, i.e.  ^ ` 0 |
0
,    it s t i GRT Y E . The 
calculation of term as an average over all of the firms not receiving grants will yield 
biased estimates if the receipt of grants is not random but correlated with observable 
firm characteristics. Thus, in order to obtain unbiased estimates, the valid 
counterfactual needs to be constructed.  
Many studies have tried to estimate the efficiency of grants by using matching 
techniques, which is one of the possibilities to construct valid counterfactuals. The 
matching technique gained popularity with the evaluation of the impact of labour 
market programmes. In case of matching techniques the goal is to form a 
counterfactual for the treated unit (in this case supported enterprise), that is the 
expected potential outcome of the supported enterprise in case of not being granted 
the support, by using the performance of the enterprises not granted a support. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, pp. 50) point out that matching “[…] is a method for 
selecting units from a large reservoir of potential comparisons to produce a 
comparison group of modest size in which the distribution of covariates is similar to 
the distribution in the treated group.” Therefore, we seek a ‘perfect twin’ for each 
observation of the treatment group, i.e. at least one observation of the potential 
control group that is as similar as possible to the treated observation with respect to 
a given distance measure. The success of these approaches depends on several 
conditions that allow the identification of the potential effect (Heckman, Hotz 1989). 
One of the most popular ones among the matching techniques is propensity score 
matching that uses for matching the probability of receiving the grant (propensity 395
score) conditional on several firm-specific indicators, i.e. the following probit model 
is used (Caliendo and Kopeining 2005): 
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where  t i X ,  is the vector of covariates including possibly firm level variables, 
regional and industry dummies, lagged values of  t i GRT , . The choice of variables 
should capture the factors that are connected to the funding agency’s decision 
making (Girma et al. 2005) and the firm’s decision to participate in the program 
(like the return from the participation). Usually the probit model is used to estimate 
the participation probability, in that case     t i t i t i X X F , , , ˆ E  c )   , where  E ˆ  is the 
vector of parameter estimates of the participation equation and   x )  is the 
cumulative density function of the standard normal. 
To get unbiased estimates with it, it is important to have a presence of common 
support. It means that all the enterprises that are in the sampling have to have the 
possibility to be supported or not to be supported. For example, if enterprises in 
trade sector were not eligible, then there should not be any trade sector enterprises 
also in the sampling. In the case of propensity score matching, it is important that 
any of the variable X-s would not define completely the participation or non-
participation in the program. 
After estimating the probability of receiving the grant it is important to eliminate 
those observations from the sample which probabilities of receiving the grant lie in a 
range that don’t have observations from both groups. After the probabilities of 
default are estimated and observations without common support are eliminated from 
the sample one can start matching.  
Let us denote  it P  the predicted probability of receiving grants (probability of 
treatment) at time t  for firm i  that actually receives the grants. A firm  j  not 
receiving the grants is then chosen as the match for the firm i  according some 
matching algorithm. In the next step the observation is deleted from the observed 
group (the group of enterprises that were supported by government). The deletion of 
the control enterprise depends on whether matching with replacement or without 
replacement was used. These steps are repeated as long as there are no observations 
left in the group of enterprises that got the governmental support. The effect of the 
program is the mean of the supported enterprises   i i Y Y E 0 1   which is compared to 
the mean that is derived from the non-supported group of enterprises. In the case of 
the algorithm without replacement, the observation is deleted from the group of 
enterprises that were not supported. In the case of the algorithm with replacement, 
the observation is not deleted form the control group and can be used again. With 396
replacement algorithm allows to use the same observation repeatedly and therefore it 
is possible to find more similar twins (Leping 2004). 
One of the most often used matching algorithms is the nearest neighbour matching 
(the firm to the comparison group is chosen is the one with the propensity score  it P
closest to the treated firm  jt P ), caliper matching (that imposes a tolerance level on 
the maximum propensity score distance  it ij P P  ) etc. (Caliendo and Kopeinig 
2005). In our study we use the nearest neighbour matching with either two or five 
neighbours, as well as the caliper matching. After the matching has carried through 
for all firms that have received the grant, the  1 ATE  can be calculated by taking the 
average of the treatment effect over all firms treated (given a grant). As to the 
Hausman (2001), matching leads to more robust results on the treatment or casual 
effect compared with other methodologies approaches. 
4. Econometric results 
The tables below present the estimation results of the propensity score matching. 
The impact of grants on four economic variables was investigated; these were the 
number of employed, labour productivity, turnover (sales) and fixed assets. Table 1 
presents first the estimation results for the probit model for the probability to receive 
the start-up grant; the probabilities from the model were used for matching. As we 
can see, the probability to receive the grant was negatively dependent on the size at 
the time of the start-up; among different economic sectors, firms in manufacturing 
had a relatively higher and in services relatively lower probability to receive grants; 
among different regions, firms in North-West of Estonia (the area with the most 
difficult economic situation in the study period) had the highest probability to 
receive the grants. 
Before calculating the effect of the grant (ATT) we also controlled for the success of 
matching by looking at the differences of the supported and non-supported firms 
before and after matching by the use of a standard t-test. In case the matching is 
successful, the differences in the mean values after matching should not be 
statistically significant; that was indeed the case (the results are nor reported in order 
to save space). 397
Table 1. The probit model for the probability to receive state aid
Variables  Parameters and z-statistics 
Number of employees  -0.042 
 (0.87) 
Central Estonia  1.206 
 (6.28)*** 
North-Eastern Estonia  1.585 
 (8.84)*** 
Western Estonia  1.278 
 (7.14)*** 
Southern Estonia  0.986 
 (5.91)*** 
Construction -0.816 
 (5.55)*** 
Business Services  -0.262 
 (2.69)*** 
Public services  -0.513 
 (3.51)*** 
Observations 7263 
Log-likelihood -471.479 
Pseudo R-squared  0.167 
Note. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
The reference categories are manufacturing and North-Estonia. 
Next we move on to the results of propensity score matching. As we can see from 
Table 2, the estimated impact of grants on job creation varies across the used 
matching algorithms. Although the numbers are positive for all estimations, only in 
the 2nd and 3rd years the impact is statistically significant in case of Kernel 
matching. The size of the impact – among the new firms receiving start-up grants the 
employment growth rate was up to 25 percentage points higher – thus in addition to 
being statistically significant these results can also be considered to be economically 
significant. When using instead of the percentage change the absolute employment 
change, the impact was positive in the 1st year, but statistically insignificant; in the 
2nd year the results were positive and significant in case of nearest neighbour 
matching with 5 neighbours (NN5) algorithm.398
Table 2. Effects of start-up grants on job creation (ATT), propensity score matching 
results
ATT 1-year  ATT 2-years  ATT 3-years  Matching 
method  Dif.  T-stat.  Dif.  T-stat. Dif. T-stat. 
Unmatch 0.100 '(1.45)  0.228  '(2.52)** 0.178  '(1.86)* 
NN 5   0.020  '(0.20)  0.174  '(1.36) 0.041 '(0.27) 
NN 2  0.103  '(1.25)  0.249  '(2.44)** 0.019 '(0.17) 
Kernel 0.083  '(1.20) 0.213  '(2.53)** 0.256 '(2.45)** 
Note. * significant at 10%; ** significant at % ; *** significant at 1 %. NN – 5: nearest 
neighbour matching with 5 matches; NN – 2: nearest neighbour matching with 2 matches; ATT 
- Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT), t-statistics are in parentheses. In case of 
Kernel matching, the Epanechnikov kernel has been used, the bandwidth has been set at 0.06 
(the default value in psmatch2 program).
Secondly we studied the impact on labour productivity (valued added or sales per 
employee). As can be noted, the results vary over the years – the impact is negative 
for the 1st year, but becomes positive and statistically significant at the 3rd year. In 
earlier studies in most cases rather the negative impact on productivity has been 
revealed (see e.g. Bergström 1998, Lee 1996, Beason and Weinstein 1996). Thus in 
this case even the result that no statistically significant negative impact can be tested 
is in a way a positive sign of the grant programme. If the goal of the grant 
programme is primarily job creation then the missing or negative impact on labour 
productivity is not unexpected. Because of that it is important to define clearly the 
goals of the grant programme and how the institution managing the programme 
estimates its impacts. One possible reason for the insignificant result is the hiring of 
the new jobs at the beginning of the period because the hiring of new employees is 
accompanied by the labour turnover or adjustment costs (time spent on the training 
of new employees, the poor quality production produced by new employees, their 
initially lower productivity). This result refer also to the contradictions in some of 
the goals of the grant programme – increasing the number of the employees and 
increasing productivity (e.g. via the preferred support of R&D activities) are 
mutually conflicting targets. Probably the training of new employees for their 
specific tasks undertaken in the enterprise takes time, thus the positive results in 
productivity could be seen only after the new employees have obtained a sufficient 
level of competence, thus in the 3rd or 4th year after the support was granted. 
Table 3. Effects of start-up grants on productivity (ATT), propensity score matching 
results
ATT 1-year  ATT 2-years  ATT 3-years  Matching 
method  Dif. T-stat.  Dif. T-stat. Dif. T-stat. 
Unmatch -1.219 '(1.51)  -0.167  '(0.04) 0.621  '(3.49)*** 
NN 5   -1.211  '(0.77)  0.389 '(0.96) 0.711 '(2.63)*** 
NN 2  -0.866  '(0.53)  0.101  '(0.23) 0.622 '(2.39)** 
Kernel -1.233  '(0.79)  0.250 '(0.23) 0.528 '(2.08)** 399
The results were most robust in case of sales growth rate – for all years and 
estimation methods significant positive effect could be seen. The supported 
enterprises increased their sales about 22-28% more than the enterprises not 
supported in the 1st year, 18-39% in the 2nd year, 33-43% in the 3rd year. We can 
note that the estimated treatment effects are sometimes greater than the unmatched 
differences; the reason could be that the supported enterprises have characteristics 
that otherwise reduce the sales growth (e.g. they could belong to industries where 
start-ups have usually lower sales growth). In many cases the size of the grant was 
considerable and equal to the owners’ equity. When instead of the percentage sales 
growth the absolute change of the sales was analyzed, the supported enterprises had 
somewhat higher sales, but the difference was in most cases statistically 
insignificant.
Table 4. Effects of start-up grants on turnover (ATT), propensity score matching 
results
ATT 1-year  ATT 2-years  ATT 3-years  Matching 
method  Dif.  T-stat. Dif. T-stat. Dif. T-stat. 
Unmatche 0.30632 '(3.67)***  0.38856  '(3.87)*** 0.381 '(3.53)*** 
NN 5   0.22529  '(2.15)** 0.31478 '(2.33)** 0.43739  '(2.88)*** 
NN 2  0.28114  '(3.25)*** 0.42425 '(4.09)*** 0.37041 '(3.29)*** 
Kernel 0.28488  '(4.28)*** 0.34335 '(4.41)*** 0.33896 '(3.95)*** 
Next, also the impact on the fixed assets was analyzed; the results can be found in 
Table 5. The impact was statistically significant in year 2, but insignificant in year 1 
and 3. The reason for the insignificant result could be that because in most cases the 
supported enterprises had at the time when they were supported more fixed assets 
(relative to unsupported enterprises), thus they might have had lower need for the 
additional investments. 
Table 5. Effects of start-up grants on fixed assets (ATT), propensity score matching 
results
ATT 1-year  ATT 2-years  ATT 3-years  Matching 
method  Dif. T-stat.  Dif. T-stat. Dif.  T-stat. 
Unmatche 0.00853 '(0.09)  0.15991 '(1.51) 0.09294  '(0.78) 
NN 5   0.01946  '(0.17)  0.39465 '(2.72)*** 0.13593 '(0.87) 
NN 2  0.08393  '(0.86) 0.22302 (2.00)** -0.02316 '(0.18) 
Kernel 0.00505  '(0.07) 0.18764  '(1.77)* 0.08651  '(0.76) 
Finally the impact on the firm survival chances was investigated, by comparing the 
survival rates of supported economically active enterprises during the years after the 
grant was given, and the other enterprises after they started their activities. The 
results in Table 6 show that at the end of the 1st year 87% of natural (unsupported) 
and 95% of supported enterprises had survived. At the end of the 2nd year the 
numbers were respectively 75% and 85%, and at the end of the 3rd year 65% and 400
77%. Also the study undertaken by Praxis reached the similar conclusions – at the 
2nd year after the receipt of the grant the firms survival rate was 89% (Kuusk and 
Jürgenson 2007). Although the positive impact of start-up grant on firm survival 
may seem to be a positive development, the possible problems may emerge if due to 
the grant the firms’ cost functions seem to be at the moment lower that they actually 
are; in such case, inefficient enterprise may survive in the market initially until the 
subsidy ceases to be in operation (Santarelli and Vivarelli 2000). Thereby also the 
market selection process by which efficient enterprises are sorted out becomes 
significantly distorted.
Table 6. The survival rates for supported and unsupported enterprises
95% confidence intervals
Interval Survival  rate  Standard 
deviation Lower Upper 
Unsupported      
1…2 0.87  0.003  0.8641  0.8757
2…3 0.75  0.005  0.7438  0.7614
3…4 0.65  0.006  0.6398 0.6619
Supported      
1…2 0.95  0.02  0.9071 0.9740
2…3 0.85  0.03  0.7827 0.8985
3…4 0.77  0.04  0.6769 0.8440
In addition to the life tables also probit model on firm survival was estimated. The 
results in Table 7 show that in the 1st year after receiving the grant the firm survival 
is negatively affected by the initial number of employees (firm size). The firm 
survival was positively affected by the initial (that of the year, when grant was 
given) level of sales and fixed assets: the survival chances were higher also in case 
of enterprises in manufacturing, construction and business services. The parameter 
for the dummy for grant is in the regression equation positive, but not statistically 
significant. In the 2nd year after grant the results were somewhat different: the firm 
survival chances were improved by their location in certain regions (Central Estonia, 
Southern Estonia, Western Estonia) and the larger firm size in the first year. The 
dummy for the grant turned out to be statistically insignificant again. Thus we can 
say that although the grant may improve firm’s survival chances, based on our data 
we are unable to find statistically significant effects. Of course the relatively small 
number of supported enterprises may make it more difficult to find out statistically 
significant relations. 401
Table 7. The probit model for firm survival 
Variables 1
st year  2
nd year 
Initial number of employees  -0.092  -0.142 
 (-2.65)**  (-3.44)*** 
Initial sales  0.058  0.093 
 (2.56)*  (3.56)*** 
Initial fixed assets  0.011  -0.051 
 (0.63)  (-2.37)* 
Manufacturing -0.448  -0.406 
 (-4.77)***  (-3.76)*** 
Construction -0.296  -0.254 
 (-2.98)**  (-2.12)* 
Business services  -0.373  -0.393 
 (-4.20)***  (-3.91)*** 
Central Estonia  0.110  0.066 
 (1.01)  (0.52) 
North-Eastern Estonia  0.137  0.141 
 (1.22)  (1.04) 
Western Estonia  -0.083  0.054 
 (-0.97)  (0.48) 
Southern Estonia  0.112  0.090 
 (1.79)  (1.19) 
Start-up grant  -0.044  0.637 
 (-0.25)  (2.16)* 
Constant 0.991  1.301 
 (3.34)***  (3.76)*** 
Number of observations  5506.000  3925.000 
Log-likelihood -1421.865 -975.727 
Pseudo R-squared  0.014  0.023 
Note. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 
The reference categories are manufacturing and North-Estonia. 
5. Conclusions 
Because the governmental business support measures distribute often a substantial 
amount of money, there is a clear need to estimate their performance and efficiency. 
The goal could be either to collect information on the successfulness of the grant 
programme, improving the performance of the programme or projects, or advising 
the further developments in government’s policies. The present study undertakes the 
ex post analysis of the success of the Estonian start-up grants distributed in year 
2002 and 2003 by the Regional Development Agency of Enterprise Estonia. For that 
purpose the propensity score matching approach was used in order to construct for 
supported enterprises a comparison group that would characterize the outcome of 402
supported enterprise in the hypothetical case when it would have not received the 
grant.
We analyzed the impact on various economic indicators like the number of 
employees, sales, owner’s equity, productivity. The impact on both on percentage 
change relative the initial level as well as on the absolute numbers was analyzed. 
According to the probit model the probability to receive the grant was higher for 
enterprises in North-East Estonia, business services and smaller enterprises. When 
estimating with propensity score matching the impact on job creation, the impact 
was positive and statistically significant only in the 2nd year after the provision of 
the grant; for the other years the impact was positive, but not statistically significant. 
While in case of productivity no significant effect could be detected (albeit the 
impact was positive), the impact on sales growth was strongly positive and 
statistically significant for all years after entry. The reason for lack of impact on the 
growth rate of fixed assets might have been the initially higher level of the fixed 
assets, thus the supported enterprises probably did not have additional need for 
investments into fixed assets. Concerning firm survival, the survival rates of 
supported enterprises were in each year higher than those of not supported 
enterprises, e.g. in the 2nd year 77% of supported and 65% of unsupported 
enterprises had survived. However, after controlling for various other firm 
characteristics in a probit model, the results did not indicate that the start-up grants 
had increased the supported firms’ survival chances. 
In the authors’ opinion the following policy implications follow from the above 
analysis. In the allocation of the business aid one needs to specify very precisely the 
requested outcome of the grant. If one wants to increase with the same grant both the 
number of jobs, productivity and R&D expenditures, then the grant might not fulfil 
any of these goals. The business aid is beneficial if by its development the market 
situation is taken into account and it offers a financing mean that is not supplied by 
the private sector due to the market failures. As the present study showed, in case of 
a well-elaborated financing instrument it is possible to achieve the desired targets 
and promote the development of entrepreneurship. On the other hand, although this 
study has demonstrated the possibility to use quantitative approaches for the impact 
analysis, we would rather suggest the combination of different methods. One 
possible further development would be to analyze the enterprises investigated in this 
study over a longer period of time so that short-lived influences on firm performance 
are eliminated. The future studies should be also based on more detailed databases, 
e.g. including information on that who are the entrepreneurs behind the start-ups. 
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